Rivals China, India in escalating war of words

[MBI Munshi]

A rising China bares its fangs

G Parthasarathy

The mouthpiece of China’s Communist Party, People’s Daily, claimed on October 14, 2009, that Indians have become “more narrow minded”. It accused India of “provocation” on border issues with China and asserted that as “nationalism sentiment” rises, Indians are turning to “hegemony” in relations with neighbours. People’s Daily called on India to give a “positive response” to China’s efforts to resolve the border issue. Pakistan was referred to as one of the countries suffering from Indian hegemony, as India allegedly sought to “befriend the far (United States and Russia) and attack the near (Pakistan and China)”. The Chinese conveniently forget how they colluded against India with the Nixon Administration during the Bangladesh conflict in 1971 and with the Clinton Administration, after India’s nuclear tests in 1998.

While China has sought to undermine India’s relations with countries in its Indian Ocean neighbourhood, even going to the extent of transferring nuclear weapons designs and knowhow to Pakistan, India has yet to fashion a coherent policy on the fears that China’s east and south-east Asian neighbours have of China’s efforts to dominate the Asia-Pacific region. Assured by the support it received after a visit by Deng Xiao Ping to Washington, China launched an unprovoked attack on Vietnam in order to teach it a “lesson” in 1979. Deng proclaimed that the “lesson” was meant to be similar to that administered to India in 1962. China again used force against Vietnam when it forcibly occupied the Paracel islands in 1974. There was yet another military engagement between China and Vietnam, when China occupied the Johnson Reef in 1988. In July 1992, China occupied Vietnam’s Da Lac Reef, establishing its first military presence there since the 1988 clash.

China claims that its territorial waters engulf three million sq km out of the total area of 3.5 million sq km in the South China Sea. Given these excessive claims, China is today engulfed in maritime disputes with Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan and both North and South Korea. Earlier this year, China complained about an official landing by Malaysia in islands it had claimed. In the same week, President of Philippines Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed a decree laying claim to two Islands that China had claimed. In February 1995, China militarily occupied the Mischief Reef in the Spratlys Islands, which was claimed by the Philippines. A month later, Philippine forces seized Chinese fishing boats and destroyed Chinese markers in Mischief Reef. Malaysia and Vietnam have joined hands to counter Chinese expansionism by jointly submitting a proposal to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea questioning China’s claims and definition of its continental shelf. Such belligerence prompts China’s Asia-Pacific neighbours to seek a US presence in the region. India would be well advised to seek a more wide-ranging strategic engagement with China’s Asia-Pacific neighbours like Vietnam and Philippines in response to China’s policies of seeking to undermine India’s relations with its immediate neighbours.

While intimidating its smaller neighbours on issues of maritime boundaries through its growing military strength, China finds its quest for hegemony hampered by two large Asian neighbours —Japan and India. It seeks to exclude the United States and India from regional fora by calling for the establishment of an East Asian Community. Concerned by such Chinese moves, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong asserted: “I think the US has to be part of the Asia-Pacific and the overall architecture of co-operation within the Asia Pacific”. This fear of China is accentuated by the virtual paralysis in Japanese foreign policy. The Chinese have spread fears about a revival of World War II Japanese militarism and put Japan on the defensive by protesting about the visits of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni shrine, which is dedicated to the memory of soldiers killed in service of the country.

Having emerged as the largest trading partner of Asia’s three largest economies — Japan, South Korea and India — and a major trading partner of the ASEAN, China appears determined to combine its economic clout and its military potential to emerge as Asia’s dominant power. Apart from using maritime power to enforce its territorial claims in the Asia-Pacific, China seeks to become a dominant player in the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean as well. Hence its proposal to the Commander of the US Pacific Fleet that in return for its recognition of American dominance in the Eastern Pacific, the Americans should acknowledge the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions as China’s sphere of influence.

China’s growing belligerence towards India on the border issue should be seen in this context of its determination to be the dominant power in Asia. Given Japan’s readiness to succumb to Chinese pressures, Beijing’s rulers see an emerging India, which shows the potential for rapid economic growth and is respected in the comity of nations as a stable democracy, as a challenge to its larger ambitions.

The unresolved border issue serves as a useful tool to keep India on edge and under pressure. China knows that no Government in India can agree to its claims on populated areas like Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. Moreover, even though China acknowledged on November 7, 1955 that the “so-called McMahon Line” was the Line of Control in the eastern sector and reiterated this on November 21, 1962, Chinese forces increasingly violate this boundary.

One of the greatest failures of China’s Communist Revolution is that despite Han Chinese constituting 91 per cent of the country’s population, the Chinese are paranoiac about their ability to handle the nine per cent of their minority populations in the strategically important, Buddhist-dominated Tibetan Autonomous Region and in the Muslim majority Xinjiang Province. This, in spite bringing in Han settlers to reduce the indigenous populations to a minority.

Tawang is seen as symbolically crucial in Chinese eyes as a centre of Buddhist spiritualism. By laying claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, China has put India on the defensive diplomatically and militarily. The Prime Minister told his Chinese counterpart in Bangkok that India regards the Dalai Lama as an “honoured guest” and a spiritual leader. Even as the dialogue with China continues, to maintain peace and tranquillity along our borders, India should not buckle under Chinese pressure and reverse its decision on the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang. Firmness, together with restraint in rhetoric, and not appeasement, are required for dealing with a growingly jingoistic China.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/211966/A-rising-China-bares-its-fangs.html

[MBI Munshi]

Tawang: Why China gets all worked up

Srinath Raghavan

The Asian Age

Oct.30 : The Dalai Lama's impending visit to Tawang has raised the hackles of the Chinese government, leading to yet another contretemps between Beijing and New Delhi. The Indian government has quite properly observed that the Dalai Lama is at liberty to travel to any part of the country, but that he could not undertake any political activity. Yet it is important to understand why China has reacted so sharply; for the underlying issues have bedevilled Sino-Indian relations over the past five decades.

The short answer is that from Beijing's standpoint the Dalai Lama's itinerary puts the spotlight on two tightly interconnected problems: the contested boundary with India, and Tibet.

China formally claims all of Arunachal Pradesh, but it views Tawang as an area where its historical claims are particularly strong. India, however, insists that the boundary in this entire sector should follow the alignment formalised in the tripartite Shimla Conference of 1913-14. The McMahon Line, as it came to be called after the then foreign secretary of India, was defined in a set of notes exchanged between Henry McMahon and the chief Tibetan delegate. This line was then marked on the map of the draft convention, which was initialled by the Chinese as well as British Indian and Tibetan representatives.

The Chinese government, however, repudiated the Shimla Convention owing to their disagreement vis-à-vis the boundaries between Tibet and China, and their desire to curb British attempts at enhancing Tibet's autonomy. China would later insist that Tibet had no right to conclude an agreement with India; for this would amount to accepting that Tibet had de facto independence in 1914. Independent India would hold that Tibet was part of China, but that in 1913-14 it had possessed treaty-making powers.

After the Shimla Conference the Indian government did not make efforts to extend its administrative presence right up to the McMahon Line. Republican China was a shambles, and posed no significant threat in the Assam Himalaya. The McMahon Line came to the fore in 1935, following an incident involving a British botanist studying the frontier tracts and Tibetan officials who controlled the area surrounding the Buddhist monastery in Tawang. Between 1938 and 1944, the Indian government belatedly sought to make good on the McMahon Line; but to no avail. Lhasa refused to withdraw its personnel from Tawang; and the British were chary of offending the Chinese - now their ally in the struggle against the Axis powers. Consequently, the Raj's administrative control could not be extended to Tawang.

Following Chinese invasion of Tibet, New Delhi decided in February 1951 to bring Tawang under its administrative hold. Interestingly, the move evoked no response from Beijing, but Lhasa protested vehemently. China's current claim to Tawang rests largely on the fact that it came under Indian control only in 1951. India's stance relies on the fact that Tawang fell on the Indian side of the McMahon Line; that its populace are Monba not ethnic Tibetans; and that Tawang had a religious not political relationship with Lhasa.

Territorial claim apart, Tawang also impacts on China's policies towards Tibet. Up to the 1950s the Tibetan administration - under the present Dalai Lama - had strongly contested India's takeover of Tawang. Beijing is concerned that if it dilutes its claims on Tawang, the Tibetans (especially the exile community) could denounce it as a sell-out on Tibetan interests and as underlining China's lack of legitimacy in Tibet. More important, there are deeper concerns about the intentions of the Indian government and the Dalai Lama vis-à-vis Tibet.

Back in 1954 India signed agreement with China recognising Tibet as a region of China and renouncing the special privileges in Tibet inherited from the Raj. These, as the then foreign secretary observed, were "a concession only to realism". However, the activities of Tibetan émigrés in border towns like Kalimpong stoked China's suspicions about Indian intentions. These steadily intensified as a rebellion broke out in Tibet in 1958. Beijing assumed, wrongly, that India was colluding with the rebels. India's decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama gave further credence to these suspicions. By mid-1959 the Chinese were convinced that India sought to make Tibet an independent, buffer state. These perceptions played a major role in China's decision to go to war in 1962.

Over the years, these concerns have been diminished but never fully allayed. This is mainly owing to presence of the Tibetan government-in-exile in India. The Indian government does not recognise the government-in-exile and has repeatedly stated that it would not allow the organisation to undertake political activities. But the Chinese are sceptical of India's disavowals.

The Dalai Lama, for his part, has moved away from his claim for Tibetan independence towards the "middle way" aimed at securing autonomy. But the mistrust between the two sides persists. As part of his autonomy proposals, the Dalai Lama seeks the integration under a single administrative entity of all the areas populated by ethnic Tibetans. The Chinese believe that the creation of a "greater Tibet" is merely a tactical ploy, designed to establish a platform for eventual independence. Hence, they insist that the Dalai Lama must accept that Tibet has always been a part of China. The Tibetans are unwilling to make such a concession as it might further undermine their case for autonomy. Besides, the Tibetan exiles are not a monolith. Chinese are wary of the influence of groups like the Tibetan Youth Congress that continue to demand independence.

The situation inside Tibet in the last year-and-a-half has heightened Beijing's sensitivities to the Dalai Lama's activities. From its perspective, the Tibetan leader's visit to Tawang brings together a number of thorny issues at a difficult time. New Delhi has handled China's response with tact and maturity. But it has to ensure that the Dalai Lama does not make any political statement that could lead to further acrimony with China. Beyond this, however, it has to think of ways to assuage the lingering Chinese concerns about its attitude to Tibet.

http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/opinion/opinion/tawang-why-china-gets-all-worked-up.aspx

[MBI Munshi]

China voices firm opposition to Dalai Lama's visit to China-India border region

Xinhua – November 3, 2009

BEIJING, Nov. 3 (Xinhua) -- China firmly opposes the Dalai Lama's planned visit to a China-India border region, said a Foreign Ministry spokesman here Tuesday.

"China's stance on the eastern section of the China-India border is consistent, and we firmly oppose the Dalai Lama's visit to the region," said Ma Zhaoxu at a regular news briefing.

"This further exposes the Dalai clique's anti-China and separatist nature," said Ma.

Ma said the Dalai Lama keeps lying and being engaged in damaging relations between China and other countries, but his attempt "will not succeed."

Ma said Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have recently held talks and agreed to push forward bilateral ties in a healthy and stable manner, which "is consensus of the people of the two countries as well as the two leaders."

In addition, Ma also called on India to "provide convenience" for Chinese workers applying for employment visa in accordance with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on simplifying visa procedures.

A new visa policy, issued in mid-July, has affected expatriates working in India on a business visa, which previously had been allowed for a wider range of occupations and employees.

Approximately 25,000 Chinese workers in such sectors as power generation, communication and petroleum in India will be affected by the new policy, according to India's media reports.

"With regard to the visa issue, China has expressed its concerns to India for many times," said Ma.

Chinese Foreign Ministry also issued a notice on its official website, warning Chinese citizens heading to work in India to acquire employment visas first.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/03/content_12377553.htm

[MBI Munshi]

Tensions hyped as Dalai Lama visits

Global Times – November 6, 2009

By Zhang Wen

Described by the Indian foreign secretary as "complex," the relationship between China and India has once again become the focal point of Indian media, just days before the Dalai Lama visits.

Many India media questioned Thursday whether the Dalai Lama's scheduled visit to a disputed area in southern Tibet (which India calls Arunachal Pradesh) Sunday has strained ties with China.

"There is no strain in bilateral ties," the Hindustan Times quoted Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao as saying Wednesday the Dalai Lama's visit, on the sidelines of a seminar at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in India.

"Our position is very clear," Rao said, while alluding to New Delhi's stance that the Dalai Lama can go anywhere in India, provided he does not indulge in political activities.

According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu Thursday, the three-day visit "further exposes the anti- China and separatist nature of the Dalai clique."

Ma also stressed that China is a responsible country and would not do anything detrimental to the interests of other countries.

However, it is not the only issue that stands between China and India.

Also there have been reports of China constructing a dam on the Brahmaputra River, which originates in southwestern Tibet and is known as the Yarlung Zangbo River in China.

After the Indian National Remote Sensing Agency reported some kind of construction on the Brahmaputra, Rao said the Chinese had denied they were building dams.

"What I want to say is that this matter has been taken up not just once but on a number of occasions with China, and China has consistently denied that it is engaged in any such construction activity on the Brahmaputra," she said.

"The point where they were making a dam is 1,100 kilometers away from our boundary. It's a small dam and no reservoir as such. They already have about 15 dams there, which they are using for local purposes," Indian water resources Minister P K Bansal told the Press Trust of India.

Meanwhile, commenting on the appearance of Chinese troops in southern Tibet, Indian Major General SS Jog, Commander of the Red Horn Division, said, "There is some sort of exercise, which they generally (carry out) during this particular time of year. They have done a few exercises, and certain amounts of troops have come in but it's a normal routine exercise."

There has been a flurry of reports in Indian media of Chinese incursions across the border, which have been shrugged off by both the Indian and Chinese governments, the ANI news agency said Wednesday.

"Many India media like to talk about China as a threat to India," Hu Shisheng, a researcher at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, told the Global Times.

"This, I see, is a lack of confidence. This trend almost forms a set pattern of reporting. It is also possible that by calling China a threat, India is actually paving the way for a strong army," Hu added.

Senior journalists from Phoenix TV said Wednesday that inaccurate reports on many sensitive issues between China and India may lead to misunderstandings between the two countries and therefore put pressure on the governments' handling of relations.

http://china.globaltimes.cn/chinanews/2009-11/483032_2.html

[MBI Munshi]

How India must face the Chinese threat

Rediff.com - November 11, 2009

India, argues Bharat Verma, needs to aggressively counter China's imperial ambitions.

New Delhi [ Images ] cannot afford to sit around while others plot its destruction.

Surrounded with sullied strategic environment and the spreading fire that engulfs the region, New Delhi can either continue to live in fear as it has in the past, or fight back.

There are two distinct threats that endanger the existence of the Union.

First are China's imperial ambitions that threaten to ultimately dismember India into 20 to 30 parts. To succeed in its aim, Beijing [ Images ] over a period of time unleashed the first phase of the strategy and intelligently encircled India. This initial phase resulted in shrinking New Delhi's strategic frontiers in its vicinity.

The Indians unwittingly made the Chinese task a cakewalk as they were preoccupied with internal bickering for short-term personal gains, overlooking the vicious expansionist agenda designed jointly by Beijing and Islamabad [ Images ] to tear apart the country.

Even as it pretended to withdraw its covert support to the rebels in India's northeast in the late seventies, China took advantage of Islamabad's hatred for India, and deftly invested in Pakistan to carry out the task on its behalf.

The primary segment of the Chinese strategy moved with clockwork precision by investing in autocratic and Islamic fundamentalist elements in countries on India's periphery -- Myanmar, Bangladesh and the Maoists in Nepal.

In Sri Lanka [ Images ], while Indians dithered, Beijing and its proxy Pakistan quickly moved in to help arm Colombo against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, develop the Hambantota port etc.

While the adversary invested in encircling India on its land and sea frontiers, the Indians merrily continued to indulge in their favorite past time -- meaningless and endless debates.

Invited by Islamabad, the Chinese moved into Pakistan occupied Kashmir [ Images ]. With growing irrelevance of Pakistan as a nation State, this area in times to come will become Chinese occupied Kashmir. Similarly, China fabricated its territorial claim on Bhutan and is working to eclipse the prevailing Indian influence there.

Is New Delhi prepared to defend its strategic frontiers in Bhutan unlike our timid response in Tibet [ Images ]?
The second phase of the long-term strategy to unravel India based on smaller geographical regions is now underway. After successfully encircling India, the recent spurts in Chinese incursions on the border, objections to the prime minister's visit to Arunachal Pradesh, lobbying against India at the Asian Development Bank [ Get Quote ], the drama of apportioning official annual budgets for the development of the so-called Southern Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh), devising opinion polls against India, issuing visas on separate sheets to residents of India from Kashmir are clear pointers in that direction.

The concluding part of the plot of unraveling the Union, if successful, will remove the challenge to China's unquestioned supremacy in Asia.

China's initial thrust succeeded not only in effectively rolling back India's influence in its external periphery, but also helped its proxies to extend their tentacles deep into India, threatening the Union's internal stability.

Therefore, the second distinct aspect that endangers the existence of the Union is the rapidly increasing internal security threat.

While the external adversary devised strategy to shrink India's influence in its 'near abroad', the individual states's inability to govern ensured rollback of authority towards their respective capitals.

The Indian sway unwittingly stands reduced simultaneously, within its borders and in its immediate vicinity. The combined intensity of the external and the internal threat, where each feeds on the other, if not handled with ruthlessness, will unravel India in times to come.

Negligence in governance is primarily responsible and permits the hostile external actors to take advantage of the internal dissent to further their imperial ambitions.

To power itself out of the largely self-inflicted external-internal encirclement New Delhi should work out a comprehensive counter-strategy with an offensive orientation. For an enduring win against the heavy odds, the national goal should be to emerge as the single most dominant power in Asia by 2020.

This aim envisages an economically powerful India backed by extraordinary military capabilities and reach, and formation of potent international alliances that help defend multi-cultural democratic values under adverse conditions in Asia.

Instead of endlessly ceding strategic space as in the past 62 years, we must learn to fight at multiple levels, and secure and extend our influence in Asia through hard and soft power on land and sea.

Pursuit of this singular national goal will automatically force us to gear up the entire infrastructure, resources, policies and strategies towards the fulfillment of this endeavour.

At present, we are an inward looking, bickering, dithering and indecisive nation. New Delhi lacks the key aspiration and therefore the vision, that motivates and impels a nation to excel and achieve worthy living standards for its citizens.

Centrality of such national core ambition will remove the prevailing confusion and the attendant aimlessness.

However, to be the pre-eminent Asian power, it is essential that New Delhi first set its own house in order by reclaiming the space lost within to the non-State actors.

Lack of skills and direction, self-serving gimmicks and dwindling integrity in the civil administration ended up in handing over the control of 40 percent area to the Maoists and ten percent on the borders to the insurgents.

It is vital that the State recaptures this space in the shortest possible time frame and establishes its authority up to the borders. Otherwise, India will be the next State after Pakistan to be consumed by civil war.

Since the Maoists and the insurgents are armed and supported by external actors, it is appropriate that they be dealt by exercise of requisite military force, before development and effective policing can take roots. The nation is witness to the fact that the Indian police and civil administration just do not have what it takes to disarm those who wield weapons against the State.

To rapidly develop the sinews of the civil administration including the police to face the war like situation brewing inside, it is crucial to inject military thinking and muscle.

First, the State should infuse military talent by offering attractive terms and conditions to retired military personnel on fixed tenure and contract basis to take the battle effectively into the heartland of Maoists and the insurgents. They are fairly young, have military skills, are motivated, and understand combat in all its hues to take on the Maoists and the insurgents.

Second, from the pool of retired military personnel, create military advisory cells in the home ministries of the states and at the Centre with adequate resources. Inter-link them with each other on a national grid to develop military appreciation of the situation on the ground and offer clear and decisive options.

Third, since it is a long haul, the central and all state police forces should pay the Indian Army [ Images ] and Navy to select and train at least 100 constables each year in their various regimental training centres to augment the armed constabulary.

Fourth, the Indian Army can select and train a few officer cadets every year for the Indian Police Service at its Officer Training Academy in Chennai on the same tough pattern as the military officer cadets. This will rapidly induct precision of military thinking and sinews that the civil administration urgently requires to fulfill the task at hand.
The success of expanding Chinese strategic reach in Asia is due to the singular fact that, unlike other Communist parties, the Communist Party of China from its inception has the advantage of precise military thinking in the party, as the People's Liberation Army officers are integral to it. The above suggestions are particularly relevant to pacifist India, as military thinking in most of the other cultures is a natural component.

In addition, remove all man made barriers like inner line permits etc to allow inter-mingling of citizenry, and establishment of businesses and industry in the northeast and Kashmir and other states.

While the terrorist, jihadi and the infiltrator forcibly change the demography, citizens are not allowed to settle and buy land in many areas of the Union. Such contradictions besides being illogical defy national integration, consolidation and fusion of the nation into one entity. However, we should avoid forced settlements like the Han Chinese in Tibet or Pakistan in the Shia-majority Northern Areas.

But, of course, the writ of the State cannot be re-established within, unless it can deliver high quality governance and development programmes.

If India had developed its military power on requisite scale and demonstrated the gumption to use it when and where necessary in the past 62 years, if the foreign office had injected military spine into its policy making, and if the enemy knew that New Delhi would respond ruthlessly if threatened, with a clear message, 'Don't mess with us!' -- I am convinced that multiple wars would not have been imposed on India.

Neither export of terrorism would have occurred on the scale it does nor China would have dared to be so nasty.
Adequate military preparedness and the ability to wield it tellingly act as deterrence, taking away the cost-benefit ratio of war from the adversary.

To emerge as the dominant force in Asia, it is therefore, essential that offensive orientation in thinking be injected across the spectrum from a young age. This entails confronting adverse geopolitical situations differently to achieve dominance.

Beijing has created an excellent infrastructure of roads and railway network in Tibet that allows them to bolster its hostile posture towards New Delhi. To create similar infrastructure on our side of the border is going to be time consuming. Therefore, if push comes to a shove, how can we innovate to neutralise the imminent threat posed by the adversary?

We should induct massive heavy lift capabilities for troops by introducing a fleet of helicopters and transport aircraft on a war footing. Initiation of superior means of mobility for the troops and extraordinary firepower will act as a robust deterrence.

We should create military capabilities to disrupt the enemy's rail supply line to Tibet.

Indian thinkers are nervous at China's declaration to further extend the railway line to Nepal and Myanmar. Brought up on pacifism, they forget that railway lines and roads can move traffic in two directions. Therefore, in case hostility breaks out, we must ensure military wherewithal to dominate these railway lines and use it to induct our troops in the reverse direction.

We must always plan to take war to the enemy using his vulnerabilities.

Kashmir legally acceded to the Indian Union, therefore, in my mind there is no dispute. However, Tibet and Sinkiang (East Turkistan) were forcibly annexed by China. These indeed are matters of dispute.

As sovereign nations, India and Tibet did not have any major boundary dispute. Therefore, illegal occupation of Tibet by China does not bestow on it any legitimacy to raise bogus boundary claims on India.

Similarly, Baluchistan was tricked into joining Pakistan. This also can be a subject of dispute. New Delhi should learn to think differently.

Wielding the weapon of psychological warfare, the Chinese recently prodded their friends in Pakistan to project via the Indian media that this is going to be the Chinese century and in Asia, the American influence is going to disappear leaving Beijing as the dominant power.

Therefore, India must decide whether it wants to side with the losing Western alliance led by America or the winning side led by China. These are symptoms of acute anxieties in Beijing and Islamabad. The presence of Americans in Afghanistan-Pakistan and the growing Indo-US strategic partnership unnerves China.

However, despite its technological superiority, the Americans cannot win the war in Afghanistan without India's help. They just do not have adequate boots on the ground.

Similarly, India on its own cannot prevail in this region and requires the Western alliance's assistance. There is a synergy of purpose. Equally true is the fact that the Americans are fighting India's war too. If they withdraw from the Af-Pak area, the entire jihad factory will descend mercilessly upon India to create mayhem.

Hence, it is in India's national interest to synergise with the West in Af-Pak to benefit from resource rich Central Asia and deny the centuries's old route of invasion to the adversary.

New Delhi must contest and reclaim the strategic space lost within and in its vicinity. Otherwise, in times to come, the Union will slip into civil war and finally wither away.

http://news.rediff.com/column/2009/nov/11/bharat-verma-on-how-india-must-face-the-chinese-threat.htm